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The Epistemic Analysis of Luck1 
Gregory Stoutenburg 
Abstract: 
Duncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it 
occurs in the actual world, but not more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds.  Jennifer 
Lackey has provided a powerful counterexample to Pritchard’s account.  Neil Levy has responded 
to Lackey by offering a modal account of luck which attempts to respect the intuition that some 
lucky events occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds.  But his account rejects 
that events which are as likely as those in Lackey’s examples are lucky.  Instead, they are merely 
fortunate.  I argue that Levy’s argument to this effect fails.  I then offer a substitute account of the 
improbability condition which respects this intuition.  This condition says that the relevant notion 
of probability for luck-attribution is epistemic, not modal. 
Introduction 
An increasingly pressing problem in epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical circles is that 
important issues appear to hinge on the concept of luck, for which we lack a satisfactory analysis.  
Knowledge is widely thought to be incompatible with beliefs that are only luckily true; 
praiseworthy or blameworthy moral conduct is thought to depend on the absence of moral luck; 
1 Thanks to Clinton Packman, Ryan Cobb, Samuel Taylor, Chris Dyer, Heather Stoutenburg, Bryan Appley, Ali 
Hasan, Brady Hoback, Patrick Beach, Mylan Engel, an anonymous referee for Episteme, and audiences at the 
Midsouth Philosophy Conference 2014 and a University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society Salon for 
comments and helpful discussion.  I especially thank Brian Collins and Richard Fumerton for detailed comments on 
multiple drafts of this paper. 
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the possibility of free action is believed to hinge on the absence of luck in such action.  Serious 
attempts to analyze the concept of luck are beginning to appear.  The most prominent accounts 
analyze luck in terms of the proportion of possible worlds in which some event occurs.  In this 
paper I defend a novel analysis of luck.  I argue that lucky events are those which are significant 
for a subject and epistemically uncertain.  I proceed as follows.  I briefly identify the key intuitions 
which drive our practice of luck attribution.  I then show how the modal account tries to capture 
these intuitions but fails to do so, and how my proposed epistemic analysis of luck adequately 
captures our key intuitions about luck.   
Luck and Luck Attribution 
This paper concerns the conditions under which an event (or, indirectly, a person) is lucky.  On 
the assumption that luck attributions are often true, we will be able to motivate a correct analysis 
of luck by means of searching for the conditions under which we are inclined to attribute luck.  It 
is not very difficult to get someone to agree that many commonplace events are at least a little bit 
lucky.  Our talk indicates that luck comes in degrees.  In ordinary language we say some event was 
“very lucky” or “a little lucky”.  These and similar expressions are used to approximate the degree 
to which some event had the property of being lucky.  When some event is even a little bit lucky, 
it is true to say it is lucky: precisely, it is a little bit lucky.  The truth of a luck-attribution depends 
only on whether the event referred to in the proposition expressed by the speaker has the property 
of being lucky.  But the appropriateness of a luck-attribution has other conditions.  For example, 
someone might be just the slightest bit lucky to score a goal, but on account of the person’s skill, 
her goal is unsurprising.  In that context, the goal has the property of being lucky, and it would be 
true to attribute luck to her goal, but it would be inappropriate to do so verbally.  We probably 
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have a threshold in mind beyond which we will not call an event “lucky”.  Still, her shot is in fact 
a little bit lucky.  Just as it is not always appropriate to assert something when it is true, it is not 
always appropriate to call something lucky when it is, nor to say it is not when it is not.  In this 
paper, I am primarily concerned with the property of luck, and so with the truth of luck-attributions.  
I will only occasionally discuss the issue of appropriateness.2 
The Intuitions of Luck 
The concept of luck is an ordinary concept.  People freely talk about events being lucky.  There 
are a few intuitions that guide our practice of luck-attribution; I attempt to identify them in this 
section.  It is easy to think of examples of luck.  Here is one: you are walking along a boardwalk 
when you stumble upon a crisp fifty-dollar bill.  Being an honest and helpful person, you look 
around to see who might have dropped the bill.  There is no one in sight.  You wait to see if anyone 
comes by for the money.  No one does.  The money is yours.  Most will agree that you got lucky 
when you found the money.  You had no reason to think you would stumble across the money 
when you went for a stroll.  The notion that lucky events are surprising, unpredictable, and 
improbable seems to play a key role in our attributions of luck.  Finding the bill is also personally 
significant to you.  Perhaps it wouldn’t be significant to Warren Buffett on account of his wealth; 
how could a few more dollars matter to him?   
 Another example: you enter a game show which offers contestants multiple-choice 
questions of increasing difficulty on different subjects.  The contestant who gets the most answers 
2 The distinction between the appropriateness of luck-attributions as contrasted with the truth of luck-attributions is 
the same as the distinction between truth-conditional properties of utterances and non-truth conditional properties of 
utterances which are important for other purposes to which we put language.  Cf. H.P. Grice (1975). 
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right wins a dream vacation.  When you arrive for the filming, you learn that the show’s topic of 
the day is ornithology.  You can barely tell the difference between a seagull and a sparrow.  Yet 
you guess your way through each question and win the prize.  Again, you were lucky: your guesses 
being correct was improbable by anyone’s lights, including yours, and your win is great news for 
you. 
When we talk about luck, we talk about events that are lucky for someone.3  There is no 
such thing as an intrinsically lucky event.  As we just saw in our two examples, lucky events are 
also improbable (in some sense) and significant to a subject (Rescher 1995, Pritchard 2005, Levy 
2011, Coffman 2007, Steglich-Petersen 2010).  The key intuitions driving our luck attributions are 
improbability and significance.  This much is nothing new.  Analyses of luck on offer in the 
literature attempt to capture these intuitions as two individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions:   
(1) An improbability condition.  Intuitively, lucky events are ones that we think 
are improbable.  When someone says E was lucky, the subject intends at least to 
convey that E was somehow unlikely.   
(2) A significance condition.  Lucky events are ones that matter to the subject of 
the luck-attribution. 
Precisely what view of luck one has depends on how exactly the improbability and significance 
conditions are understood.  One could, in principle, conjoin any interpretation of the improbability 
condition that one likes with any significance condition one likes.  For example, one could take a 
modal improbability condition and add a subjectivist view of significance which says that some 
event is significant if and only if a subject actually cares about it.  A different view results if the 
3 As Coffman (2007) indicates, groups may also be the subjects of luck.  In such cases, their luck reduces to the luck 
of the group’s members. 
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subjectivist condition is understood counterfactually, so that an event is significant if the subject 
would, with appropriate information and reflection, care about the event.  Or the significance 
condition could be understood objectively, so that what is significant for a subject depends upon 
preference-independent facts about the subject and her place in the world (Coffman 2007).  Similar 
variation is possible with the improbability condition, as we shall see shortly. Most of the debate 
about luck in the literature concerns the precise formulation of the modal improbability condition 
(Pritchard 2005, Coffman 2007, Levy 2012).  I now turn to that issue.  
Improbability—The Modal Accounts 
The intuition behind the modal view of luck is straightforward: lucky events are those which could 
have easily been different.  Lucky events are improbable in that sense.  The basic idea is that an 
event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world but not in the majority of nearby worlds.  That 
account of improbability, hooked up with a significance condition, delivers a modal account of 
luck.  I now briefly introduce Pritchard’s account. 
Pritchard 
One currently influential modal account of the improbability condition is offered in Duncan 
Pritchard’s book Epistemic Luck.  Here is Pritchard: 
L1 If an event is lucky, then it is an event that occurs in the actual world but 
which does not occur in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the 
relevant initial conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world 
(2005). 
For Pritchard, what is improbable about a lucky event is that it occurs here but not there, for a 
“wide class” of alternative theres.  Pritchard is not firm about how wide the wide class has to be, 
granting that a lucky event may obtain in up to half of the nearest possible worlds.   
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 Jennifer Lackey (2008) has presented a powerful objection to L1, of which the following 
is a paraphrase.   
BURIED TREASURE.  Sophie, soon to die, buries a chest of valuables on the 
northwest corner of an island, a place of deep importance to her, and a place 
where she hoped roses would sprout in the future.  Some time later, Vincent 
comes to the island to plant a rosebush in his mother’s memory, and finds the only 
suitable location: the place directly above Sophie’s buried treasure.  He begins 
digging and finds it. 
Here is a case where Vincent is intuitively lucky to find the treasure.  He found, unaided, a treasure 
chest.  But, as Lackey has pointed out, the case has been crafted so that Vincent finds the treasure 
in at least the majority of worlds where the relevant initial conditions to the event are the same: 
the Vincent and Sophie are acting out of deep-seated dispositions, and it is these dispositions that 
conspire to help Vincent find the treasure.4   
 BURIED TREASURE shows that Pritchard’s L1 is not a necessary condition on luck 
because lucky events may occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds.  Neil 
Levy defends a modal account and contests the moral drawn from this case. 
4 It would be easy to imagine that the dispositions in question are such that a description of the nearby neighborhood 
of possible worlds is such that Vincent was almost guaranteed to find the treasure.  To be sympathetic to Lackey’s 
case, I presume we should not think of the event as quite so likely to happen.  The intuitive idea behind the case is 
just that there can be events which are lucky because they are significant to a subject, but they are likely enough to 
happen that a modal improbability condition will struggle to allow the intuitive verdict on the case. 
 Of course, there is a dialectical risk in offering any thought experiment: some people won’t be moved.  To 
those unmoved, I have two remarks.  First, it seems to me that an effective way to check for the intuitive pull to 
describe a state of affairs presented in a thought experiment using some important term is to offer a minimal 
description of the scenario and to see how strong the intuition is that the term applies to that state of affairs.  If it is 
strong, that is at least good evidence that the state of affairs is properly described by the term.  So, the fact that we 
are inclined to say that a man finding buried treasure is lucky (extremely lucky!) prior to learning of the background 
is at least evidence that the man finding treasure is, in fact, lucky.   
 Second, the argument of the paper is ultimately conditional in structure: if there are lucky-but-probable 
events, then the epistemic analysis of luck argued for in this paper is the best hope of accounting for them.  Clearly, I 
think the antecedent of the conditional is true.  
 I owe thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to say more about this case and its role in the 
structure of my argument. 
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Levy 
Levy defends a modal account as a condition of “chancy” luck (in contrast with “nonchancy” luck, 
of which constitutive luck is a species) in his Hard Luck (2011).   
Event E is chancy if it occurs in the actual world at t1, but it fails to occur in a 
large enough proportion of possible worlds obtainable by making no more than a 
small change to the actual world at t0; and the agent lacks direct control over E’s 
occurrence (Levy 2011). 
Levy makes two modifications to L1.  First, he adds a lack of control condition.  Second, he argues 
that whether an event is chancy depends in part upon how significant the event would be for the 
subject.  Levy’s threshold for how improbable an event must be to count as lucky is tied to how 
significant the event is.5  The more significant the event is, the more probable the event is allowed 
to be while still counting as not happening in a “large enough” percentage of possible worlds.  This 
permits Levy to identify (modally) probable events as lucky. 
Levy’s view ably handles the Russian Roulette case (Rescher 1995).   
RUSSIAN ROULETTE: Samuel plays and wins one standard round of Russian 
Roulette: a single trigger pull of a 6-round revolver with only one bullet in the 
chamber. 
Levy acknowledges that anyone who plays and “wins” Russian Roulette is lucky.  But the odds of 
winning are in the player’s favor: there is only a 1/6 chance that the outcome is death and a 5/6 
chance that the player finishes the game unscathed.  Levy argues that what makes a game of 
Russian Roulette chancy is that the 5/6 odds of survival are not high enough given that the 
significance of the 1/6 event is very high.   
5 No machinery is provided to explain what exactly the connection is or how the probability threshold is determined 
by the significance of the event.  Levy claims, “Luck is a vague concept, and an adequate account of it must be 
vague (in the same way and in the same places) as well” (2011, pp.18) 
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 Although Levy wants to allow that sometimes probable events are lucky, he wants to 
prevent highly likely events from counting as lucky, as he recognizes that allowing the significance 
condition to swamp any probability, no matter the degree, threatens the modal account itself.  That 
motivates his response to BURIED TREASURE: because Vincent would find the treasure in too 
many possible worlds, he is not lucky.  Levy argues that we should accept an error theory regarding 
this mistake.  He argues that we often confuse luck with fortune.  Call this the ‘confusion with 
fortune’ error theory.  Fortune, he says, is had when one is the positive or negative beneficiary of 
some event, even if the event was highly probable.6  Fortunate events are non-lucky events with 
luck in their proximate causes.  In BURIED TREASURE, Levy argues, Vincent is not lucky to 
find the treasure, he is merely fortunate to do so. 
I agree with Lackey that finding buried treasure is “a paradigmatic instance” of a lucky 
event (2008).  Philosophers who agree that the analysis of luck is the analysis of an ordinary 
concept that finds expression in ordinary language had better do everything possible to preserve 
our strongest intuitions regarding that concept in order to guard against substituting technical 
concepts different from the ordinary concepts we seek to analyze.  Methodologically speaking, the 
severity of denying what Levy is denying–that the finding of buried treasure is lucky–should not 
be overlooked.7   
6 As is the case when philosophers talk about luck, I assume Levy would understand talk of fortune to include both 
good and bad fortune, and would further add that, in ordinary talk, we often mean “good fortune” when we say 
“fortune”, and we use qualifiers like “bad” only when we want to make clear that we mean “bad fortune”. 
7 Even Levy seems to worry that he might not have an intuitively well-motivated reason for rejecting that BURIED 
TREASURE is an instance of luck: “My intuition that Vincent is not lucky might be theory-driven, and might 
therefore simply beg the question against her” (2009, pp. 494).  He goes on to offer some theoretical grounds which 
I consider shortly; for now, it is important to note that he thinks the fortune/luck distinction may not be easily drawn 
on intuitive grounds alone. 
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There is probably not a non-technical distinction to be drawn between fortune and luck.  
To see this, we should try to isolate the meanings of those terms.  One way we can try to do this is 
to consider pairs of structurally identical sentences and try to ‘hear’ the differences in meaning 
between them.  For instance,  
 “The evening star is visible today.” 
vs. “The morning star is visible today.” 
Contrasting this pair reveals that the two sentences express something different.  One notices some 
difference in meaning between the two sentences.  On the other hand, this pair reveals no 
difference: 
 “I was lucky to win that award.” 
vs. “I was fortunate to win that award.” 
It is easy to come up with more examples: just take any sentence where you are inclined to use 
“luck” or “fortune” and consider the pair of sentences which results from substituting the words.  
I doubt there are many, if any, ordinary sentences in English where “luck” could not be substituted 
with “fortune” without effecting a semantic change.  That is a very compelling reason to resist the 
suggestion that speakers are confusing two similar concepts: what it suggests, on the contrary, is 
that we have two words for one concept. 
 Sometimes words mislead.  But we now have strong prima facie evidence that luck and 
fortune are one and the same.  I want to be clear about what I intend behind this test.  I am not 
saying that this test is conclusive proof of semantic equivalence.  What I am saying is that when 
two terms are inserted into structurally identical sentences and then read side-by-side, if no 
difference is heard, one thereby gains (at least) defeasible evidence of semantic equivalence.  
Further tests may reveal a difference, but some argument will be needed at that point to evaluate 
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whether the difference concerns pragmatic or semantic factors.  For example, if I win an award 
and someone tells me that I am lucky to have done so, I may take it that the person has implicitly 
claimed that I do not deserve the award.  My intuition on this point is not as strong if the person 
instead tells me that I was fortunate (rather than lucky) to win the award.8  But note that this further 
implication concerns what appears to be a pragmatic implication, not a semantic difference.  (The 
sentences, “you were lucky to win that award” and “you were fortunate to win that award” sound, 
to me, like harsher and gentler ways, respectively, of saying the same thing.)  I think that our test 
suggests strong evidence of semantic equivalence, and that defeating that evidence will require 
some plausible explanation of why we often confusedly attribute luck where we ought to attribute 
fortune instead.   
 Levy’s ‘confusion with fortune’ error theory attempts to provide just such an explanation.9  
He claims that when we mistakenly attribute luck instead of fortune, it is because luck is very near 
in the vicinity: a fortunate event is a non-lucky event with luck in its proximate cause (2009; 
2011).10  BURIED TREASURE is an instance only of fortune, Levy claims, because it is by luck 
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to clarify this point. 
9 E.J. Coffman offers a different version of the ‘confusion with fortune’ error theory for all attributions of luck to 
events which occur in more than half of relevant nearby possible worlds.  He claims that the winner of standard 
Russian Roulette isn’t lucky, and that we confuse the appropriateness of the assertion, “You are lucky you didn’t 
die in that silly ‘game’!” with its truth (2007).  While it is appropriate to assert that sentence, Coffman argues, the 
assertion isn’t true.  Someone making the assertion likely wishes to point out how irrational it is to play Russian 
Roulette in order to dissuade that person from doing it again.  In order for this error theory to succeed, however, 
Coffman would need to convince us that when we attribute luck we are thinking about an imagined spoken sentence 
rather than a state of affairs.  I’m confident that when I make or refrain from making a luck attribution in some 
instance, I’m judging that the concept LUCK applies in that case.  I am not—or at least I need not be—imagining 
myself saying, “That was lucky.”   
10 The appropriate nomological ‘distance’ between effect and proximate cause is left implicit in Levy.  Because he is 
responding to Lackey, and because he does not challenge what Lackey might have in mind as the proximate 
cause(s), I take it that the proximate causes of Vincent’s finding of the treasure consists in something like the 
complex consisting of the following: Sophie and Vincent having the dispositions they have, the island having the 
geological and biological properties it has, Vincent’s mother having died, and Vincent’s knowledge of the nutritive 
requirements of rosebushes. 
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that Vincent and Sophie have the modally robust dispositions they have, and that state of affairs is 
a proximate cause of Vincent finding the treasure chest.  The ‘kind’ of luck responsible here is 
constitutive luck: luck in one’s constitutive traits and dispositions (Levy 2009; 2011; following 
Nagel, 1979).  Levy’s main reason for accepting that constitutive luck is a species of luck is that 
there is a strong intuition in favor of considering a child born with a congenital defect as unlucky: 
indeed, he claims that a view that denies that intuition “is misusing words, and leaves itself open 
to the objection that it avoids counterexamples by stipulation” (2009, pp. 495).   
 To make good on the error theory and provide a unified analysis of luck, Levy’s account 
needs to identify some genus of which chancy and non-chancy (e.g. constitutive) luck are 
species.11  The account will also have to ensure that the two species-concepts are similar enough 
to each other that it is plausible that competent ordinary speakers would readily confuse them, 
misattributing luck to an event which isn’t lucky because another species of luck is causally 
responsible for that (non-lucky) event.  A problem arises immediately: constitutively “lucky” traits 
are non-chancy, and so not obviously subsumable under the analysis of luck Levy defends.  The 
very test Levy proposes for revealing whether or not an event is chancy—that of holding fixed 
some agents and temporally-prior events and varying other properties and events—reveals that the 
traits which constitute an agent vary only minimally in nearby possible worlds.  The thought seems 
to be this: if S is a member of class F, and many Fs have trait C, then the nearby possible worlds 
11 Levy himself offers these success conditions for his analysis.  He writes, “If there is an account of constitutive 
luck that is both plausible and not ad hoc, then constitutive luck is genuinely luck; the measure of ad hocness here is 
the degree to which the account diverges from [the account of chancy luck]” (2009, pp. 496).  If my argument in the 
next few paragraphs is successful, then the two accounts of luck differ not in degree, but in kind.  Thus the account 
of constitutive luck is ad hoc. 
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which include S will usually include S’s being C.  But if that so, then S’s being C is not chancy, 
but probable.12   
How, then, would ordinary speakers confuse Vincent’s being lucky with his merely being 
fortunate if his being fortunate is a result of him having some trait he would probably have had in 
similar circumstances?  Since Levy is defending an error theory that says speakers confuse luck 
with fortune, Levy has to find some luck in the proximate causes of Vincent’s finding the treasure.  
For this, he proposes that Vincent’s behavior was grounded in a trait for which he is constitutively 
lucky, rather than chancily lucky.  Of course, that is not enough to make plausible Levy’s claim 
that speakers readily confuse (chancy) lucky events with events that are non-lucky but have 
(constitutive) luck in their proximate causes.  The problem is that if the concepts are not similar 
enough, the claim that speakers confuse the two will not be plausible.13   Levy attempts to subsume 
chancy luck and constitutive luck under the genus ‘luck’ by defining non-chancy luck so that it 
includes the significance and lack of control conditions, but has a different improbability condition.  
Levy claims “there are some close parallels between constitutive luck and chanciness” (2009, pp. 
496).  Having given up analyzing constitutive luck using a modal improbability condition, he 
instead opts for a statistical improbability condition: traits that vary widely within some (relevant) 
reference class14 of which I am a member are traits for which I am constitutively lucky (2009, pp. 
496; 2011, pp. 33).   
12 See footnote 11 for discussion of the problems raised for Levy by this understanding of luck. 
13 This follows from the problem of how constitutive and chancy luck are related plus Levy’s claim that speakers 
confuse lucky events with fortunate events.  My argument is that if the analyses of fortune and luck Levy proposes 
were the ordinary concepts, the confusion would be rather surprising because speakers would be confusing two very 
different things.  
14 The view faces the ever-present problem of the reference class which faces statistical analyses generally.  Levy is 
aware of the problem, and claims that the relevant reference class is fixed by context (2011, pp. 34).  It is less clear 
whether he thinks the appeal to context actually solves the problem: a person who survives a plane crash is lucky 
qua survivor of a plane crash to have only lost three limbs; the very same person qua human being is very unlucky 
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The analysis of luck Levy is offering calls upon an improbability condition, and that 
condition is spelled out using two distinct concepts of probability.  Introducing these into the 
analysis vitiates the attempt to provide an analysis of a single, unified concept.  The new analysis 
of luck is disjunctive: (given the other conditions) an event is lucky if EITHER it is the result of a 
trait which is statistically unlikely within a relevant reference class OR the event fails to occur in 
a large enough proportion of nearby possible worlds with the same relevant initial conditions.  Put 
a little differently, if Levy is trying to provide an analysis of a concept, the improbability condition 
must state, “E is either statistically improbable or modally improbable.”  That the analysans 
includes as a single necessary condition the satisfaction of one or the other of two distinct concepts 
of probability entails the two concepts are distinct. 15  
The disjunctive analysis does not serve Levy’s purposes well.  First, one of the motivations 
behind offering the ‘confusion with fortune’ error theory was to explain why we might confuse 
fortune with a closely related concept, namely, the concept of luck.  But once the analyses are 
spelled out, these do not appear to be closely related: it is unclear how fortune and luck are 
appropriately similar because it is unclear how constitutive luck and chancy luck are appropriately 
similar.  The two concepts of luck share, in rough description, a few necessary conditions—
significance and lack of control—but the concepts rely on notions of probability very distinct.  It 
seems unlikely that even ordinary speakers are confusing modal probability with statistical 
to have done so.  In ordinary discourse context by itself does not solve the problem of the reference class: we often 
use, in addition, some clarifying device to indicate the reference class we have in mind, e.g. “So many of the people 
on the flight with you died; you’re lucky to have only lost some limbs.” 
15 Suppose Levy were to drop the idea that we misattribute luck to probable events because there is luck in the non-
lucky event’s proximal cause, and keep part of the error theory otherwise intact, claiming that we misattribute luck 
when a statistically improbable event or trait is a proximate cause of some event.  This trimmed-down error theory 
would avoid the complications related to the analysis of luck discussed above, but it would also lose all plausibility 
as an error theory: the mistake speakers make when luck is misattributed would then be locating luck where there 
isn’t any to be found at all. 
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probability.  Ordinary speakers have the resources to distinguish between the two concepts: we 
talk about things that could have easily been different (modal probability) and characteristics that 
aren’t common (statistical probability), and we understand the difference between these notions.  
Even if one thinks ordinary speakers lack the discernment to spot the difference, certainly 
philosophers—including those who find BURIED TREASURE compelling—do understand the 
difference.  Second, another main motivation behind offering the error theory was that there 
seemed to be too much luck.  But now, there will be too much fortune.  Any event which is the 
result of the activity of a statistically unlikely trait in some agent is fortunate.  My own linguistic 
intuitions are quite content with positing an abundance of luck; why should Levy’s be better served 
by positing an abundance of fortune?   
Levy was compelled by the intuition that an event could be modally probable while still 
being lucky.  In order to capture that intuition but avoid threatening the defensibility of the modal 
account, he offered a ‘confusion with fortune’ error theory.  I have argued that it is not possible to 
both defend a modal improbability condition and respect our intuitions about probable lucky 
events.  I propose to simply move forward with a non-modal improbability condition.   
The Epistemic Analysis of Luck 
Thus far I have argued that modal improbability is unnecessary for luck.  I want to argue that a 
different notion of probability is at work in luck.  To start, consider the way in which our 
attributions of significance to subjects behave.  For an event to be lucky requires that it significant 
to the subject for whom an event is lucky.  As I noted briefly above, just what analysis of 
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significance ought to be given is debatable.16  But any plausible account of significance will allow 
that whether an event is significant can vary by subject.  If E matters to you but not to me, then E 
could be lucky for you, but not for me.  Take a subject for whom an event is improbable enough 
to be lucky and for whom the event is very significant.  That event is lucky for that person.  Now 
substitute someone who is identical in every way except that for the substitute, the event is 
insignificant.17  The event is non-lucky for that person.  This result follows from the significance 
condition on any account of luck, regardless of the kind of probability required by the account. 
On the view I defend, this same sort of variation applies to the satisfaction of the 
improbability condition, not just the significance condition.  The improbability condition I defend 
is an epistemic improbability condition.  One and the same event can have different probability 
assignments for different epistemic subjects, and therefore one and the same event can have 
different luck assignments (even when the significance of the event is equal to the two subjects).   
 The intuitions we surveyed early in the paper lead naturally to an epistemic account of luck.  
Lucky events are often hard to predict and surprising, as are events for which I lack sufficient 
evidence to anticipate.  An epistemic improbability condition easily captures the intuitions that 
seemed to support the modal accounts.  Our intuitive judgments regarding what happens in nearby 
possible worlds are guided by our appreciation of the relevant evidence.  We judge that an event 
16 My own view, which I have no space to defend in this paper (but which I hope to defend at a later time) is that an 
event is significant to a person when that person would regard the event as significant, when informed about the 
event and the conditions surrounding the event.  Notice, first, that this is not a definition of “significant”, because 
“significant” appears in the definiens.  Second, this counterfactual subjective significance condition allows for an 
event to be lucky for a subject when (1) the improbability condition is met and (2) the subject does not actually 
know about the circumstances leading up to the event: even, perhaps, that the event has already taken place. 
17 Someone who thinks that significance should be understood as an objective notion cannot allow that in a case like 
this, a duplicate subject with different preferences from the original subject can have varying significance-
attributions.  That is because (presumably) what is objectively important for any subject is precisely what is 
objectively important for any individual who is identical to that person, regardless of the person’s attitudes. 
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would or would not happen in some proportion of nearby possible worlds on the basis of 
experience.  Experience gives us a sense of what would happen in certain circumstances in virtue 
of what has happened in similar circumstances: an event which, on our evidence, is likely to 
happen is one that we (sometimes) judge happens in a large number of nearby possible worlds.  
The intuitive judgments driving the modal account have their origin in assessments of evidence.18  
For that reason, the epistemic account can successfully mimic the intuitive verdicts on cases that 
the modal accounts deliver.  So, an epistemic improbability condition can deliver the verdicts on 
cases we seek, and it can mimic any verdict that the modal theorist can offer by appeal to possible 
worlds.   
 To my knowledge, the only other person to argue for an epistemic interpretation of the 
improbability condition on luck is Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2010).  He defends the following 
improbability condition: “S is lucky with respect to E at t only if, just before t, S was not in a 
position to know that E would occur at t.” As he recognizes, what it takes to be “in a position to 
know” varies by philosopher.  He claims that one’s knowing that an event will occur entails having 
all other positive epistemic statuses with respect to the proposition which says that the event will 
occur (2010, pp. 369).  Depending on one’s epistemological views, however, this claim is false.  
Take G.E. Moore, for instance.  He thought that it was possible to know that pencils exist.  He did 
not think that his knowing this entailed that he had evidence which guaranteed for him that there 
18 Note that the defender of a modal account cannot reciprocate my claim about the priority of the epistemic to the 
modal.  Although it seems that there is an intuitive sense in which there could be a higher or lower ‘proportion’ of 
near and relevant possible worlds in which some event happens given some (to-be-specified) initial conditions, there 
are, presumably, infinitely many near and relevant possible worlds in which the event occurs.  So the modal theorist 
requires some way of relating sets of infinitely many possible words in order to make sense of these ‘proportions’.  I 




                                                 
were pencils.  So, if Steglich-Petersen were to ask Moore if it was at all lucky, in any relevant 
sense, that his belief about pencils is true, Moore would say “no”, even while it is epistemically 
possible for Moore that his belief is false.19  But I think that Steglich-Petersen wants Moore’s 
belief to turn out at least a little bit lucky.  It is not clear, however, how the account will deliver 
that result.  Even if Steglich-Petersen’s account could be stated in such a way that it gave that 
verdict, it seems to me that the account will do best to discuss epistemic probability, and not 
knowledge.  For that reason, I will avoid reference to knowledge in my analysis of the 
improbability condition on luck.20 
Luck comes in degrees.  I defend the following definition of the improbability condition 
on luck:  
(EAL) Event E is lucky to some degree for subject S when E was/is not 
epistemically guaranteed for S.   
I call this the Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL).21  I take the epistemic guarantee of an event to 
be equivalent to the event’s having an epistemic probability of 1 on one’s evidence.  Furthermore, 
how lucky an event is is partly a function of how epistemically probable the event is.  Holding 
fixed the significance of some event, if the event has an epistemic probability of 1, then the event 
is not at all lucky, to any degree whatsoever; if the event has an epistemic probability of .95, then 
it was a little bit lucky; if the event has an epistemic probability of .1, then it was very lucky; and 
so on. 
19 Moore is clearest about this in (1959).  He there seems to hold that he can be certain that p is true even while he 
does not have evidence guaranteeing the truth of p. 
20 All of that being said, however, I believe that Steglich-Petersen and I are much in agreement about the analysis of 
luck, at least with respect to the improbability condition. 
21 In my view, but not explicitly in this paper, EAL refers to the conjunction of this condition plus a counterfactual 
subjectivist significance condition.  That condition says E is significant for S if the subject would, upon some 
amount of reflection, care whether E.  Defending that condition on EAL will require a separate paper. 
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 This account seems to suggest that there is quite a bit of luck in the world (so long as the 
significance condition is also met).  If the condition claimed only that a lucky event is one that is 
epistemically improbable—that is, has an epistemic probability of 0.5 or lower—and significant, 
then the account would be open to the same sorts of counterexamples as the modal accounts.  It is 
epistemically probable that I will win a game of twenty-chamber Russian Roulette.22  But winners 
of that game are lucky, so the epistemic improbability condition is insufficient.  There are only 
two options: specify an arbitrary threshold below which events are epistemically improbable 
enough to satisfy the improbability condition, or allow that any event is lucky to some degree when 
its occurrence is not epistemically certain for the lucky subject.  At risk of repetition, there is 
intuitively a lot of luck in the world unless much of our luck-talk is false.  That is why the condition 
is stated as requiring only epistemic possibility: the lack of an epistemic guarantee.  These 
probabilities are determined by epistemic factors, not psychological ones.  Psychological certainty 
is not epistemic certainty.  Simply being absolutely (but unjustifiably) sure that an event will occur 
does not make the event non-lucky.   
Let us return to the cases that got our discussion started.  EAL delivers the correct verdicts 
on BURIED TREASURE and RUSSIAN ROULETTE.  In both cases, the events are significant 
to the subject.  In the former, EAL claims that Vincent is lucky because the epistemic probability 
for him that he would find a treasure chest was very, very low.  In the latter, Samuel is lucky to 
win because he couldn’t be epistemically sure that the chamber with the bullet wasn’t next in line 
to fire.   
22 Plausibly, the a priori probability of a Russian Roulette win is 5/6.  That is why a strict epistemic improbability 
condition does not, by itself, seem to fare better than a modal condition. 
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EAL is open to various accounts of how epistemic probabilities are determined.  My own 
view is that epistemic probabilities are determined by features which are reflectively accessible to 
a subject, namely a subject’s experiential states and beliefs, plus the evidential relations between 
these states and beliefs.  But that is not the only account of how epistemic probabilities are 
determined, nor is it the only account consistent with EAL.  For example, one might hold that it is 
possible that one’s evidence can consist at least partly in facts that guarantee the truth of one’s 
beliefs, even for propositions about the external world.  Then one could hold EAL and claim that 
we have lots of beliefs about the external world that are true and not at all lucky, because we 
possess evidence which guarantees that they are true.  Therefore, EAL alone does not guarantee 
that intuitively non-lucky events are in fact lucky: only EAL combined with an account of 
epistemic probability can do that.  That being said, I do not wish to disguise the fact that the way 
I think of EAL, many events that one might not readily say are lucky are, in fact, lucky, so in the 
following discussion I will assume that we are combining EAL with an account of evidence which 
allows that we often lack such factive evidence. 
 It will help EAL be viewed in a positive light if I can argue that we can divorce the truth 
of luck-attributions from their appropriateness.  I said above that, pragmatically speaking, luck 
attributions seem to undermine the attribution of credit and responsibility: if I say you were lucky 
to win some award, you might take offense that I seem to have implied that you did not deserve to 
win it.  Now, I do not think that we naturally say that highly (modally or statistically) probable 
events are lucky.  For example, according to EAL, Tiger Woods is at least a tiny bit lucky whenever 
he hits a ball beyond 50 yards.  Since it was epistemically possible for Woods that the ball would 
fail to go 50 yards, then on the assumption that it is significant to him that the ball go further than 
50 yards, Woods is the slightest bit lucky that his drive goes as planned.  It would definitely not 
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be appropriate to say so, because that would pragmatically imply that Woods does not deserve 
credit for his successful drive.  Still, the hit is just a little lucky.  His club head could have broken 
off, a pigeon could have flown into the ball at the 10 yard mark, he could have had a heart attack 
during his backswing, etc.  Once possibilities like these are raised, it is easy to admit that Woods’ 
long drive is a little lucky.  However, it would be wildly inappropriate for an onlooker to see 
Woods’ drive and assert, “That was a lucky shot!”  The improbability of his drive passing the 50 
yard mark is so miniscule as to be unassertable. 
Even when we would not be too naturally inclined to attribute luck to a likely event, making 
various possibilities salient causes us to recognize that the event was not as sure to happen as we 
might previously have claimed, and thereby to attribute some degree of luck.  When we raise these 
sorts of possibilities, even about events that we continue to believe were overwhelmingly likely to 
occur, we recognize that some amount of luck was present.  In this way, our practice of luck 
attribution behaves much like our practice of knowledge attribution: it sounds as bizarre to say, “I 
know that P, but I’m not sure whether P,” as “It’s not at all lucky, to any degree, that E, but I didn’t 
have conclusive reasons to expect E”.23  This remarkable similarity suggests that there is something 
in common between luck- and knowledge-attributions: if EAL is true, and luck-attributions are 
assessments of epistemic probability, that would explain the similarity.  But notice that the 
comparison only follows for an account of knowledge which connects knowing a proposition with 
that proposition having an epistemic probability of 1.24 
23 Just how to understand knowledge attributions and retractions like these is a matter of present debate.  Defending 
EAL does not require taking a position.  For representative positions, see DeRose 2009, Rysiew 2001, Stanley 2005, 
Fantl and McGrath 2009, Unger 1975. 
24 See Williamson 2002 for an attempt to accept this without accepting skepticism.   
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 When we attribute luck to a subject, we often do so by taking up that subject’s perspective.  
From the perspective of an omniscient being nothing is (or would be) lucky, on the assumption 
that omniscience requires knowledge of future contingent propositions, because the truth value of 
every proposition would have an epistemic probability of 1.  It doesn’t follow from RUSSIAN 
ROULETTE being non-lucky from God’s perspective that it is in fact non-lucky.  Earlier, I argued 
that any plausible account of the significance condition will allow that a single event could be 
significant for one person, and thus a candidate for luck for that person, while insignificant for 
another, and consequently not a candidate for luck for that person.  Evaluating the proposition 
Samuel is lucky to be alive depends upon selecting an epistemic perspective from which to evaluate 
the proposition.  When I say that Samuel is lucky to be alive, I could mean that Samuel’s surviving 
was not epistemically certain for me.  Or I could mean that Samuel’s surviving was not 
epistemically certain for him.  Evaluating the truth of a luck-attribution requires specifying the 
epistemic position from which we are making the attribution.  So, according to EAL, whether an 
event is lucky requires (1) evaluating the event for significance from different perspectives, and 
(2) evaluating the event for epistemic probability from different perspectives.  
 This completes my presentation of EAL.  I now consider two important objections. 
Odd Luck  
EAL claims that an ordinary event which is epistemically possible for some person and which is 
significant for that person is lucky.  In the case of low epistemic probabilities, the events are not 
only lucky, but highly lucky.  Suppose there are persons who, for some reason or other, have 
epistemic probability assignments out of step with most of ours.  Then it may follow that because 
of their bizarre epistemic probabilities, the truth of luck-attributions from their perspective varies 
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from the truth of luck-attributions from other perspectives, including ours.  This is the odd luck 
objection. 
 This objection is not worrisome for EAL.  First, epistemic probabilities are constrained by 
rules on every plausible account of epistemic probability.  That a probability is epistemic requires, 
in part, that it be conducive toward truth.  The “oddness” of these individuals’ probability 
assignments therefore cannot be due to simple wishful thinking or cognitive vice.  Epistemic 
probabilities for a subject are not open to tampering independently of evidence possessed by that 
subject.  So, for a problematic odd luck scenario to obtain would require that a person have a 
bizarre set of experiences which actually epistemically justify propositions to a degree different 
from the rest of us.  Any plausible theory of epistemic probability will hold that it is possible for a 
proposition to be justified to some degree for some individual while that same proposition has a 
different probability for some other person.  The existence of unusual believers like these does not 
impugn EAL. 
Second, any subjectivist significance condition entails a similar result.  Some individuals 
take more events to be significant, and to a higher degree.  When this happens, subjectivist 
accounts of significance allow that these persons are better positioned with respect to how much 
luck they will enjoy.   
Luck and Ignorance 
Because EAL makes the possession of luck dependent upon epistemic probabilities, what happens 
when a subject lacks any reason to suspect that some intuitively lucky event has/did/will occur?  
The following case illustrates this problem. 
KILLER COKE: Unbeknownst to me, all cans of Cherry Coke in my region have 
been accidentally poisoned as the result of a shipping factory mishap.  The only 
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person aware of the mishap is the Regional Director, who learned of the mishap 
too late to stop the cans from being sold, but before anyone drank any of the 
hazardous beverages.  I walk to my refrigerator, open a can, and take a sip.  I 
don’t die: also unbeknownst to me, another mishap occurred when a can of 
Cherry Coke owned (but never opened) by a driver from a different region 
accidentally made its way into my region’s shipping facility and ended up in my 
twelve-pack.  That’s the one I’m drinking now.  Thanks to this series of accidents, 
I got lucky.25   
Intuitively, one might think, my not dying from sipping that Cherry Coke is lucky.  But the 
epistemic probability for me that this can would be a killer was no higher than it usually is: that is, 
it is low.   
EAL is not defeated by this objection.  First, when we consider the proposition surviving 
the killer Coke was lucky we are considering an ambiguous proposition.  Luck-attributions are 
made and evaluated from an epistemic perspective, and we are not always explicit about which 
perspective we are adopting.   In this case, as in others, we have to choose the perspective from 
which we will evaluate the luck-attribution.  The perspectives that are relevant for this case are the 
Regional Director’s actual epistemic perspective, the Regional Director’s counterfactual epistemic 
perspective, or my perspective. The Regional Director could truly and warrantedly assert “that was 
lucky”, so long as the proposition he has in mind is (i) I (the Regional Director) am lucky that E 
or (ii) if I (the Regional Director) were the person drinking the Coke, I would be lucky.  His 
assertion is clearly true on interpretation (i): at a minimum, he would have lost his job for 
unwittingly releasing poisonous beverages for general consumption.  And on interpretation (ii), he 
would be considering my brush with death from his more informed perspective and would 
therefore regard the event as lucky if he were me.  Only if what the Regional Director wishes to 
assert is the proposition the Coke-Drinker is lucky from the Coke-Drinker’s own perspective does 
25 Thanks to Richard Fumerton for this objection. 
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his assertion even threaten being problematic.  Even in that case, though, the Coke Drinker is lucky 
from the Coke Drinker’s perspective, because the significance condition is met (were the Coke 
Drinker in possession of evidence concerning the events leading up to drinking the Coke, the Coke 
Drinker would undoubtedly regard the event as significant) and so is the improbability condition 
(the proposition this Coke is non-lethal was not epistemically guaranteed, and never is).  The only 
potential worry now is that the proposition this Coke is non-lethal is no more epistemically 
improbable for the Coke Drinker now than it normally is.26  So it may appear that EAL delivers 
the wrong result on how lucky an event is.  The appearance is illusory: the probabilities being what 
they are, the event is far more significant to the subject than the drinking of a normal Coke is, 
because the subject would regard this situation as more significant than other situations in which 
the subject drinks a Coke.  How significant an event is partly determines how lucky it is.  That 
being the case, it is at least unclear that KILLER COKE poses a serious objection to EAL. 
 Second, those still worried by this case may wish to replace the epistemic improbability 
condition stated above with a counterfactual epistemic possibility condition, so that the degree to 
which an event is lucky in the actual world varies partly with how epistemically probable the event 
would be for that subject under certain counterfactual conditions.  One way to articulate this 
modified version of EAL would be to tie the counterfactual epistemic probability condition to the 
counterfactual significance condition: the account would then state that for purposes of luck-
attribution, the probability of the event is equal to how probable the event is in whatever conditions 
need to be realized for the subject to count the event as significant.  Further qualifications are 
clearly needed, however: once the subject has the evidence necessary to make an informed 
26 Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me to clarify this point. 
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significance judgment, the epistemic probability of the event has also increased considerably, and 
therefore will count as very significant, but also very probable, and consequently not lucky.  Were 
I to consider the sequence of events that led to my drinking a safe Coke, I would indeed find it 
significant.  (I now know that I almost died, after all.)  For the same reason, at the time of your 
asking me, I acquired testimonial evidence that I narrowly escaped death.  Maybe the 
counterfactual epistemic probability condition should therefore take the epistemic perspective of 
an informed actual-world third-party, plus the already stated counterfactual subjective significance 
condition.  The difficulty now is choosing among unequally informed (and possibly non-actual) 
third parties.  Perhaps an account of a counterfactual epistemic possibility condition could be 
developed which would avoid the unwelcome results just described.  I find no reason to develop 
one here, however, because I find the first reply satisfactory: once we disambiguate the possible 
meanings behind the assertion, it is clear that the luck-attribution is true from every perspective 
including the Coke drinker’s, and therefore we are able to make perfect sense of our luck 
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